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COMPARISON OF NEW ZEALAND AND UNITED STATES SECURITIES MARKETS
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS:
ASPECTS OF THEIR SYSTEMS OF DISCLOSURE ACCORDING TO THE EFFICIENT
MARKET HYPOTHESIS
by
CARLA NATALIA GARGIULO
(Under the Direction of Dr Fredrick Huszagh)
ABSTRACT
In the United States the Efficient Market Hypothesis has dictated academic
debate on securities law, particularly in the consideration of the regulatory system of
mandatory disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act 1934.1 In New Zealand the
Efficient Market Hypothesis has rarely been cited by the legal fraternity, the courts or by
politicians. However, capital market ideas are entrenched in the Efficient Market
Hypothesis,2 and because New Zealand has been at the forefront of deregulation since
the early 1980s it has a regulatory system of mandatory disclosure which reflects, at
least in part, the principles of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Chapter 1 of this thesis reviews the literature concerning the Efficient Market
Hypothesis. Chapter 2 provides a general description of the characteristics of the New
Zealand and United States financial environments, and then focuses on the legal and
regulatory systems of mandatory disclosure within which those countries operate.
1

Cunningham, Lawrence A., Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price
Discovery, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 843 (1994) at 844
2
Cunningham, Lawrence A., Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price
Discovery, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 843 (1994) at 844

Chapter 3 discussed applying the Efficient Market Hypothesis to the environments
described in Chapter 2. It considers whether the New Zealand and United States
financial markets can be considered efficient markets under the accepted definition. It
then examines some examples of existing mandatory disclosure laws, both in the
United States and New Zealand, which seem to rely on notions that are supported by
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, whether or not these notions are expressed as such.
Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between efficient markets and mandatory
disclosure laws, and then summarises how this relationship has been reflected in New
Zealand and the United States. The conclusion is that there are many aspects of
Efficient Market Disclosure apparent in the legal and regulatory systems in the United
States and New Zealand.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
Introduction
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides an introduction to the topic of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis. The historical roots of the Efficient Market Hypothesis are
considered and a survey of the recent academic comment on the nature of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis is undertaken, both positive and negative. An attempt is made to
formulate a definition of the Efficient Market Hypothesis from the material considered.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis underlies much of contemporary thinking in
relation to regulation of the financial markets. Financial markets exhibit two types of
efficiency; operational and allocative efficiency.3 Operational efficiency refers to the
cost-effectiveness of a range of intermediaries between buyer and seller.4 Allocative
efficiency refers to a market where information may be obtained freely or cheaply by all
so that investors have the opportunity to make informed and sensible choices.5 The
information is widespread and all information is reflected in prices.6
Definition
The concept of allocative efficiency was substantially expanded by Eugene Fama

3

Fisse, B., NZSE and the Securities Market in New Zealand in Securities Regulation in
Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B. (eds), at 122
4
Id. at 122
5
Id. at 122
6
Id. at 122

2
in 1965, when he first coined the term “efficient market”. 7 His innovative paper defined
an efficient market as a market with a high number of participants striving for profit
maximisation “with each trying to predict future market values” and where “information is
almost freely available to all participants”.8 The basic concept underlying market
efficiency is that competition between market actors will cause all information to be
quickly absorbed into the price of securities. Share prices reflect information, therefore
an efficient market will, on the average, reflect information into market prices
“instantaneously”.9 Therefore information based on events which have already occurred
and on events which the market expects to take place have already been impounded
into the prices of specific shares.10 Conversely, information will only slowly be reflected
into market prices if the market is inefficient, and may not reflect information into market
prices at all.
In an efficient market, as soon as news about a stock reaches the stock
exchange, traders act on that information.11 If the news is good news (information
about a new product or a potential merger or takeover) investors will buy and the price
of that stock will increase by as much as the value of the information.12 If the news is
bad news (an earnings decrease or a major loss) investors will sell their stock and the
price will decrease accordingly.13

7

If the news is neither good nor bad, investors will

Fama, Eugene F., Random Walks in Stock Market Prices in Posner and Scott (eds),
Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation (1980) 329 at 157
8
Id. at 157
9
Id. at 157
10
Id. at 158
11
Fraud-On-The-Market Theory and Thinly Traded Securities Under Rule 10b-5: How Does a
Court Decide if a Stock Market is Efficient?, Wake Forest Law Review Vol 25 (1990) at p 227
12
Id. at p 227
13
Id. at p 227
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disregard that information and the price will remain stable.14
Later research identified three different levels of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
as reflected in the capital markets, weak-form, semi-strong and strong-form. Each form
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is more comprehensive than the earlier one.
The market is said to be efficient in weak form if current share prices fully reflect
all the information contained in past price movements. Weak-form efficiency asserts that
share prices fully reflect all sharemarket information, including the historical sequence of
prices and trading volumes. This implies that there is no relationship between past
price changes and future price changes.15 Past prices contain no information about
future changes and price changes are random. Prices will only change on the basis of
new information.
The market in said to be in semi strong form when current prices reflect not only
past prices but also all publicly available information. Trading rules are unable to
produce superior returns because there are no undervalued or overvalued securities.
When new information is released, it is fully incorporated into the price relatively
promptly. There is some evidence of public information impacting stock prices within
minutes.16 Semi-strong efficiency assumes that share prices adjust rapidly to the
release of all new public information, including economic news, share earnings, etc.
Consequently, security prices reflect all publicly available information.17

14

Id. at p 227
Fisse, B., NZSE and the Securities Market in New Zealand in Securities Regulation in
Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B. (eds), at p 122
16
Gosnell, T.F., Keown, A.J., and Pinkerton, J.M., The Intraday Speed of Stock Price
Adjustment to Major Dividend Changes: Bid-ask Bounce and Order Flow Imbalances, Journal of
Banking and Finance 20, 1996
17
Fisse, B., NZSE and the Securities Market in New Zealand in Securities Regulation in
Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B. (eds), at p 122
15
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The market is said to be efficient in strong form if stock prices reflect all available
information, including private information. Specifically, the strong form of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis asserts that current stock prices not only reflect all published and
known information but all relevant information, including information not yet published.
Strong-form efficiency contends that prices fully reflect all information, both public and
private.18 As a result, no investor has a monopolistic access to information relevant to
the formation of prices allowing them to be able to gain above average profits every
time.19 Therefore a strong form market will deny even the insider from making an above
average profit. Fama has acknowledged that the Efficient Market Hypothesis is unlikely
to offer an exact description of the behaviour of share prices.20 Indeed, Fama has
stated that “as there are surely positive information and trading costs, the extreme
version of market efficiency is surely false.”21
Early in the development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis the focus was on the
‘random walk’ nature of share prices.22 However, current thinking is based on the
rational expectations model, whereby financial markets are based on rational
expectations about asset values.23 Therefore the information that is integrated into
share prices is simply information that is reasonably related to expectations about future

18

Id. at p 122
Id. at p 122
20
Fama, Eugene F., Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, in Posner and Scott (eds),
Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation (1980) 329
21
Fama, Eugene F., Efficient Capital Markets: II., The Journal of Finance, 1991, Vol. 46, No. 5
(December), 1575-1617
22
Langevoort, Donald C., Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 140: 755] at p 852
23
Id. at p 856
19

5
values.24 It then becomes reasonable to maintain that prices reflect the “the most
rational possible assessment of present value”.25
One of the tenets of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is that the actors are
expected to act rationally in the pursuit of monetary gains.26 However, one of the
principal objections to the EMH theory is that investors are not rational. There are a
number of factors to explain why investors do not behave rationally.
One of the factors that explains why investors do not behave rationally is that
individuals become predisposed to poor judgement as the certainty of decision-making
decreases.27 A number of studies suggest that investors often find patterns in what is
statistically random data.28 Research has indicated that investors disregard information
and risks that do not support their opinion, while putting too much emphasis on
information that does support their opinion.29 Investors may invest without all the
information, and some subjective data indicates that some investors decide whether to
invest in an initial public offering even before the required offer documents (investment
statement and prospectus) are available.30
Another factor which explains the irrationality of investors is related to the
intrinsic value of investments. Maximisation of expected returns in dollar terms in not

24

Id. at p 857
Id. at p 857
26
Id. at p 858
27
Wydeveld, M., Considerations in Explaining Investor Behaviour, New Zealand
Securities Commission, September 1999,
http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/publications/documents/behaviour.shtml
28
Statman, M., Investor Psychology and Market Inefficiency, Equity Markets and Valuation
Methods, 1987
29
Wydeveld, M., Considerations in Explaining Investor Behaviour, New Zealand
Securities Commission, September 1999,
http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/publications/documents/behaviour.shtml
30
Id.
25

6
the exclusive motivation for individual investors.31 There may also be intrinsic rewards
coupled with an investment, for example, an investment may present an investor with
the chance to fulfil a long held desire to be involved in the making of a movie.32
A further factor which may explain the irrationality of investors is the tendency to
“herd behaviour”.33 Herd behaviour suggests that individual investors can be affected
by the actions of others and this type of behaviour has often featured in financial
markets.34 Investors may trade on noise which is caused by the actions of others as if it
were information and it may persuade investors to buy and sell more often than they
would otherwise.35
Another factor which may explain investor behaviour is investor's pride.
Research has indicated that commonly, people are highly confident in their intuitive
judgement, which may mean that they are prone to illusions and poor judgement.36
Some research shows that investors frequently believe their decisions are based on
superior information while unaware what information is available to the opposing party
to their trade.37 There is evidence that investors are less likely to sell securities which
they have personally selected.38 Pride is also a factor in the regularity with which
investors trade as the investor takes pride from the perception that they are playing the
share market.39

31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
32
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Another related factor driving some investors' behaviour is the possible fear of
regret. This factor is most likely to dictate investor behaviour where individual investors
are not confident of their information, or their own ability to process it, and where the
potential loss to their pride of a wrong choice is thought to be too much to go through.40
The result is that some investors, when faced with deciding between a popular or
unpopular security, may decide on the popular security because it would be simpler to
justify losses if everyone else has purchased the same security.41 Institutional investors
may also exhibit this type of behaviour when they aim to protect their reputations.42
Research has revealed that investors confronted with the decision to sell an
investment are influence by whether the security was originally purchased for more or
less than the current price.43 It is also suggested that investors, in losing funds, are
reluctant to face the evidence that they have made a poor investment by selling their
investments at a loss. In some circumstances investors may even be driven to take high
risk investments to attempt to break even, and in so doing will save face.44 Indeed, the
exposure of losses frequently seems to be the cause of a great deal of
embarrassment.45
These factors clearly illustrate that for a variety of reasons investors do not
always act rationally, however this may not invalidate the Efficient Market Hypothesis.

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
41
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“The validity of the efficient market hypothesis is based on a set of statistical
tests demonstrating that the market prices securities as if there was a rational
process, whether or not the market’s constituent actors qualify as rational.”46
Therefore the Efficient Market Hypothesis does not reject the possibility of irrational
conduct by some sharemarket actors. However the Efficient Market Hypothesis does
minimise the potential.47
There is no universally accepted definition of market efficiency. However, simply
and briefly put, it is well established that “[there is no other proposition in economics
which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the efficient market
hypothesis.”48
Research in the eighties and nineties criticised and challenged the early research
and there are some critics who do not subscribe to the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
However, for the purposes of this thesis I will accept the definition based on the on the
rational expectations model, whereby financial markets are based on rational
expectations about asset values.49 Therefore, it is accepted that information is
integrated into share prices because it reasonably related to expectations about future
values.50 It then becomes reasonable to maintain that prices reflect the “the most
rational possible assessment of present value”.51

46

Langevoort, Donald C., Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 140: 755] at p 852
47
Id. at p 857
48
Jensen, Michael C., Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin. Econ.
95, 96 (1978)
49
Langevoort, Donald C., Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 140: 755] at p 856
50
Id. at p 857
51
Id. at p 857
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Competition in the securities industry is the major “driving force” behind this swift
digestion of information into the market.52

Information is a valuable asset in the

securities business and security analysts will research both financial reports and
information about companies with publicly traded securities.53
Further, it must be determined whether there is a need for a mandatory
disclosure system under the Efficient Market Hypothesis. If both the New Zealand
markets and the United States markets are generally accepted to be in the semi-strong
form then some form of mandatory disclosure would be required because it is unlikely
that private information has been absorbed into share prices in these markets. In
particular the New Zealand market will require some form of compulsory disclosure
regulation as investment research activities by analysts and other informational
activities by the private sector are less significant than in the United States. It then
needs to be determined whether the New Zealand and United States markets are
efficient.

52

Lorie, J. & Brealey, R., Modern Developments in Investment Management, A Book of
Readings 102 (1972)
53
Id.
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CHAPTER 2
FEATURES OF THE NEW ZEALAND AND UNITED STATES
FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
This chapter looks first at the different characteristics of the financial environment
in New Zealand and the United States, then focuses on the legal and regulatory
environment in which they operate.
New Zealand – Financial Environment
Since 1984 the government has accomplished major economic restructuring,
transforming New Zealand from an agricultural economy dependent on concessionary
British market access to a more industrialised, free market economy that can compete
globally.54 Economic deregulation in New Zealand has been rapid and wide-ranging
since 1984, including major structural change in the financial sector.55

Changes

included complete removal of the all price regulations in the financial sector, freedom of
entry to financial markets, and a preference for open market operations as instruments
of monetary control.56 The exchange rate was floated, international capital controls
were removed and foreign investment liberalised.57 The rapid opening up of the
economy to competitive pressures and the release of all financial sector restrictions
gave rise to some excesses in the business and financial community.58 There were a
considerable number of business failures and demands on banks and financial services
54

The World Factbook 2002 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Intro
Walker, G. The Policy Basis of Securities in New Zealand in Securities Regulation in
Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B. (eds), at p 176-177
56
Id. at p 176-177
57
Id.at p 177
55
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providers, many of which were not capable of managing the new freedom and did not
have suitable management skills or risk management practices in place.59
New Zealand has now one of the world's most open and competitive
economies,60 but capital investment remains a significant issue for the New Zealand
economy.61 Large-scale capital investment transformed New Zealand into an efficient
producer and exporter of primary products, however these industries are now declining
in importance and capital investment is required in new and developing industries to
sustain the New Zealand economy.62 The New Zealand economy is short of capital for
items that require a large input of capital and issuers need to look to offshore
suppliers.63 Reasons for lack of domestic capital include poor capital productivity, the
level of household savings, government demands of national-capital resources and
limited capital markets, all of which influence the accessibility and cost of capital.64 A
further reason for the lack of domestic capital in New Zealand is the paucity of
advanced, specialised-capital markets, which inhibits the development of competitive
advantage in the New Zealand economy.65
It is the role of the government and the private sector to remove endogenous
capital constraints and it is necessarily distinct from the regulation of the securities
market, however an appropriate regime of securities regulation may support the

58

Abernethy, Ieuan H., The Changing Nature of Financial Services, 18th Annual Banking Law
Conference, http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/speeches/eas080601.shtml
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Walker, G., The Policy Basis of Securities in New Zealand in Securities Regulation in
Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B. (eds), at p 176-177
62
Id. at p 178
63
Id. at p 178
64
Id. at p 179
65
Id. at p 179
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elimination of such constraints and result in beneficial economic effects.66 New Zealand
securities regulation is seen as part of a larger goal of economic growth because
domestic demand for capital cannot be met internally due to endogenous capital
constraints.67 Consequently, the structure of New Zealand’s securities regulation must
be internationally compatible and in so doing support the inflow of capital into New
Zealand.68 It is therefore a reasonable inference that New Zealand must meet the
expectations of international investors in regulating its capital and securities markets in
order to secure an adequate inflow of foreign capital.69
New Zealand - Legal and Regulatory Environment
This portion of the chapter sketches the structure of New Zealand’s securities
regulation. Both the history of securities law in New Zealand and the philosophy
underlying them are examined, A brief outline is then given of the two major pieces of
securities legislation in New Zealand, the Securities Act 1978 and the Securities
Markets Act 1998.
New Zealand currently has a considerable number of protection and control
systems in place in relation to the securities markets. The implementation of these
systems was a reaction to the stock market collapse that occurred in the United States,
which then flowed down to New Zealand in the 1980s.70 The key laws of today’s
investment environment are directed specifically at those who manage companies that

66

Id. at p 179
Id. at p 172
68
Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into the Sharemarket (1989), para 2.3
69
Walker, G. The Policy Basis of Securities in New Zealand in Securities Regulation in
Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B. (eds), at p 178
70
Abernethy, Ieuan H., The Changing Nature of Financial Services, 18th Annual Banking Law
Conference, http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/speeches/eas080601.shtml
67
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issue securities to the public and controlling their behaviour.71 A summary of these laws
is as follows.
The Companies Act 1993 comprises a number of investor protections, including
public registration of companies, protection of shareholders, defined directors’ duties
and provision for their enforcement; disqualification of directors and supply of
information.
The Financial Reporting Act 1993 delineates the nature and content of financial
information that companies must present to their shareholders. In order to readily
evaluate the financial information, the presentation is required to have a high level of
standardisation for comparative purposes.
The Investment Advisers (Disclosure) Act 1996 requires specified disclosures
where any person or organisation offers investment advice. These disclosures include
personal details including any recent convictions for dishonesty crimes, bankruptcy, and
details of their procedures for the receipt and disbursement of invested funds. On
request further details such as qualifications, experience, conflicts of interest must be
provided.
The Financial Transactions Act 1996 requires reporting of cash transactions over
a specified amount or any suspicious transactions to facilitate the prevention, detection,
investigation and prosecution of money laundering.
The two major pieces of legislation in New Zealand are the Securities Act 1978
and the Securities Markets Act 1988. It is these pieces of legislation that control the
issue of securities, the behaviour of shareholders and seek to keep up the flow of

71

Darvell, P.P., & Clarke R.S., Securities Law in New Zealand, 1983 at p 4
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information about the company and its activities.72 Securities regulations, both in its
statutory form and in the New Zealand listing rules, seek to ensure that an informed
market is maintained.73 In New Zealand the traditional policy basis of securities
regulation is investor protection.74 The primary method used to realise that purpose is
disclosure of material information by the issuer of public securities to the prospective
and/or existing investor.75 The Securities Commission, in its “Proposed
Recommendations for Securities Regulation” (March 1990) stated:
“ our conclusion upon the desirable bases of security laws for public issues in
New Zealand is that their thrust should be directed towards attaining public
disclosure of relevant information. We are required to consider this question as
at the time of formation of investment contracts (which, we should say, is not the
only relevant time). Our view is that at that time the potential investor should be
told; it matters not that he does not understand. Some of those who are told will
understand, and as Professor Loss has observed, the effects of their conduct in
understanding will seep through to the general body of investors. To those who
must provide information they feel is surplusage to their well-conducted activities,
we feel obliged to say that the burden of providing it is part of the price they must
pay for the benefit of public confidence in the fund-raising mechanisms of the
business sector. The alternatives are to pass the control of access to capital to
some regulatory agency, or substantially to increase the legal liability of

72

Latimer, Paul, Securities Regulation Laws – What Are They Trying to Achieve?, in Securities
Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, Walker, Gordon and Fisse, Brent (eds), at p 167
73
Id. at p 167
74
Id. at p 171
75
Walker, Gordon, The Policy Basis for Securities Regulation in New Zealand, in Securities
Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, Walker, Gordon and Fisse, Brent (eds), at p 171

15
businessmen for the funds entrusted to their care. This Commission sees its
responsibility as to assist in securing that New Zealand commercial law is well
adapted to the marshalling of resources and the transaction of business. In a
system in which businessmen appeal directly to the public for funds, we think
businessmen should publicly say who they are, and tell what they do.”
The courts have supported this interpretation and in Re AIC Merchant Finance
Ltd., Richardson J stated:
“The pattern of the Securities Act… makes it plain that the broad statutory goal is
to facilitate the raising of capital by securing the timely disclosure of relevant
information to prospective subscribers for securities. In that way the Act is aimed
at the protection of investors.”76
The Securities Act 1978 has two major purposes. Firstly, the Act creates the
Securities Commission. The Securities Commission has a watchdog role in relation to
the whole securities industry and is now empowered to enforce breaches of securities
law. The Securities Commission has been operating since 1979.77
Secondly, the Securities Act 1978 provides for the application of a homogeneous
prospectus regime to most public offers for securities.78 The public offering of most new
securities is controlled by the Act, together with the Securities Regulations 1983. The
terms “securities” and “public” are both widely defined in the Securities Act 1978.79 In
relation to disclosure, the main requirements are for a public issuer to provide all
investors with both a prospectus and an investment statement on offering shares to the
76

[1993] NZLJ 194 at 198
Darvell, P.P., & Clarke R.S., Securities Law in New Zealand, 1983 at p 3.
78
Id. at p 3.
79
Section 2, Securities Act 1978.
77
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public. The Securities Act 1978 requires registered prospectuses for public offerings of
securities and the Securities Regulations 1983 stipulate the information and reports
which must be contained in the prospectuses, and impose a number of specific
restrictions on the content.80 However, although the prospectus must be prepared, it is
not required to be provided to an investor unless requested.81 Instead the focus of the
disclosure is on the investment statement. The investment statement is intended to
provide a format which can be easily understood by individual private investors using
plain language and answering a set of specified questions. An investment statement
must be received by any person who subscribes for securities.82
The Securities Market Act 2003 has only recently implemented a system of
periodic disclosure.
United States – General Environment
The United States has the biggest and most technologically powerful economy in
the world.83 It is a market-oriented economy, and United States business firms enjoy
considerably greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in
decisions to expand capital plant, lay off surplus workers, and develop new products.84
United States corporations lead in technological development, especially in computers
and in medical, aerospace, and military equipment.85
There is a high level of domestic capital available in the United States and, unlike
in New Zealand, there are a number of advanced, specialised-capital markets which
80

Darvell, P.P., & Clarke R.S., Securities Law in New Zealand, 1983 at p?.
Section 54B, Securities Act 1978.
82
Section 33, Securities Act 1978.
83
The World Factbook 2002, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Intro
84
Id.
85
Id.
81
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increase the development of competitive advantage, For example, in the United States
the venture capital industry has developed specialised skills for the equity financing of
high-risk, high-growth enterprises in the software business. This is a powerful
advantage for the development of the United States software industry. 86
United States – Legal and Regulatory Environment
The major piece of legislation is the Securities Act of 1933, which has two basic
objectives:
•

to require that investors receive financial and other important information
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and

•

proscribe deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.

The key method of achieving accomplishing these objectives is the disclosure of
significant information through the registration of securities. This information enables
investors to make knowledgeable judgements about whether to purchase a
corporation’s shares.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It enables the Securities and Exchange Commission to act with authority
over all aspects of the securities industry. This includes the power to register, regulate,
and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies as well as the
nation's securities self regulatory organisations. Various stock exchanges, such as the
New York Stock Exchange, are self regulated organisations.

86

Walker, Gordon, The Policy Basis for Securities Regulation in New Zealand, in Securities
Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, Walker, Gordon and Fisse, Brent (eds), at p 179
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The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also identifies and prohibits certain types of
conduct in the markets and provides the Securities and Exchange Commission with
disciplinary powers over regulated entities and persons associated with them.
The Act also empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission to require
periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securities.

19

CHAPTER 3
APPLYING THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS TO THE LOCAL
ENVIRONMENT
What form of allocative efficiency is reflected in the United States and New
Zealand
If information about a security is being processed efficiently then the efficient
market hypothesis is valid. Therefore the efficient market hypothesis will only be of
value if the market to which it is applied is an efficient market.87
Economists use linear theory to show why public capital markets are efficient.88
To avoid the need for complex economic equations of linear theory “it is more
reasonable to approximate efficiency by looking at the more easily identifiable…
characteristics that indicate the market is developed.”89 This chapter identifies the
factors that can be used to support the conclusion as to whether a market for a
particular stock is efficient. The presence or absence of one or more of these factors
does not point to a market as either efficient or not efficient, but efficiency can be seen
as a broad scale upon which a security may move depending on circumstances. The
presence or absence of one or more of these factors points to efficiency of a market on
a broad scale. At one end of the scale is a heavily-traded stock on the New York Stock
Exchange where each of the mechanisms for an efficient market are present and the
market is identified as highly efficient. Such mechanisms include a large number of
87
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analysts regularly researching the company, market trading, many shareholders,
institutional investors. The prices of stocks on this type of market would almost
instantaneously adjust to new information.90 On the other end of the scale is a
regionally traded corporation listed on an over-the-counter market, where trades are
infrequent between a small number of shareholders. There are no mechanisms present
that regulate the market and allow information about the company to be efficiently
processed. In this case a shareholder cannot rely on the price of the share to be
accurate and may need to rely on some other source of information, such as a
prospectus.91
The specific factors which have been identified as supporting or opposing the
view that a particular market is an efficient market include:
•

an open and developed market;

•

the identity of the security’s trading market;

•

whether the stock is a leading gainer;

•

and the average trading volume.

These factors have been identified from a number of sources, both judicial and
academic.92
An open and developed market is the first factor which is critical in assessing the
efficiency of a securities market.
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“[A]n open market is one in which a large number of people freely purchase a
security. A developed market is one in which a large buy or sell order will not by
itself alter price.”93
This means that there is a relatively high level of trading for which trading information is
widely available and it will usually have continuity and liquidity.94 This requirement is
necessary under the Basic v. Levinson ruling which is discussed later in this thesis.
Eligibility for form S-3 registration is the second factor which is influential in
assessing the efficiency of a securities market. In the United States a security that
proceeds by way of form S-3 short-form prospectus is deemed to be a security trading
on an efficient market.95 The United States Securities Commission bases the form S-3
on the basis of the efficient market hypothesis theory so by definition the corporation is
trading via an efficient market.
There is no New Zealand equivalent to form S-3 because the New Zealand
Securities Commission uses its power to allow the use of a short-form prospectus on a
different basis. Under section 5(5) of the Securities Act 1978 the Commission is able to
exempt any person or class of persons from compliance with Part II of the Securities Act
and any regulations made under section 70(1) of the Securities Act (dealing with the
disclosure requirements for offers of securities to the public). This allows the issuer to
provide a short-form prospectus only. The New Zealand Securities Commission bases
its exemption on whether security holdings are outside the purposes or objects of the
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regime96 and makes no assumptions as to the efficiency of the market on which that
security is traded.
The security’s trading market is the third factor which is significant when
assessing the efficiency of a securities market. Unless there is evidence of an anomaly,
a security trading on the American Stock Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange
can be assumed to trade on an efficient market.97 If the security trades in a “lesser”
form of over-the-counter market, such as the “Pink Sheets”, a court will need to examine
other factors to determine if the market is efficient for that security.98
In New Zealand the only stock exchange is the New Zealand Stock Exchange,
and it is commonly accepted amongst traders that the New Zealand Stock Exchange is
a semi-efficient market.99
Whether a particular share is a “leading gainer is another factor which is useful in
assessing the efficiency of a securities market. A “leading gainer” is one of the most
actively traded securities on its market and in so doing it is being traded efficiently when
it is.100 This proposition is supportable because intense trading tends to occur in
concert with exposure in the financial press, reporting by professional analysts and the
presence of institutional investors in the market for that security.101
Average trading volume of a share is another factor used in assessing the
efficiency of a securities market. The courts in the United States have viewed average
trading volume as a key indicator as to whether a security is being traded efficiently:
96
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“The reason the existence of an actively traded market, as evidenced by a large
weekly volume of stock trades, suggests there is because it implies significant
investor interest in the company. Such interest, in turn, implies a likelihood that
many investors are executing trades on the basis of newly available information
or disseminated corporation information.”102
For example, it will be assumed that a security is trading on an efficient market if the
turnover of a security on an over-the-counter market is the same as the turnover of a
security on the New York Stock Exchange.103 An alternative proposition is that
turnover measured by average weekly trading of two percent or more of the outstanding
shares would raise a strong presumption that the shares are being traded in an efficient
market.104 Even turnover of one percent may raise a substantial presumption.105
A following by security analysts is another key indicator used in assessing the
efficiency of a securities market. This is because the likelihood that all information
distributed by a corporation is being relied on is increased if there are a large number of
security analysts following a particular security.106 In the United States, hundreds of
security analysts will track the major corporations while only a few analysts will track the
smaller corporations.107 In New Zealand, there are only a limited number of analysts
and they will focus on the larger corporations also, although these are far smaller in size
than in the United States.
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Assessing the efficiency of a securities market can also be indicated by the
presence of market makers. In the United States a market maker will instantly buy and
sell large blocks of stock on receipt of new information from a corporation in an overthe-counter market.108 It has been proposed that a showing of ten market makers will
raise a substantial presumption that a market is efficient, while even five market makers
will raise a presumption, though weaker, that a particular market is efficient.109
Similarly, institutional holders can also indicate the efficiency of the market because
institutional investors carry out a role similar to that of market makers.110 They also
have the means to carry out research into the financial reports of companies and use
their expertise.111
A further indicator is media coverage because it is to be expected that stock
market activity will increase if the interest of an average investor is amplified by
significant coverage of a security in the financial press.112 The efficient market develops
through a competitive and vigorous financial press.113 United States publications
include the Wall Street Journal, Forbes and Business Week. In the Wall Street Journal
the investment column is Heard on the Street, in Forbes, the column is Informer and in
Business Week it is Inside Wall Street.114 The New Zealand publications are The
Independent and the National Business Review. In The Independent the column is
known as Chalkie and in the National Business Review it is Shoeshine. Each of these
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publications attempts to attract readers with their own stockmarket analysis. The
publications look for “inside information” and print columns with investment advice that
has the potential to result in wise investment decisions, and otherwise circulating
information to the investors.115
Finally, one other indicator of efficiency in the market is cause and effect data.
Historical data can be used to show that a particular security is trading in an efficient
market. The data must show the effect of information, both positive and negative, on
the price of a security.116
In general, in New Zealand investment analysts tend to support the view that the
New Zealand stockmarket is in the form of a semi-strong efficient market, in that new
publicly released information is rapidly and rationally factored in to share prices.117 The
consequences of that are that investors, when selling or buying securities, are usually
doing so at prices that reflect all publicly available information.118
However, the New Zealand market is subject to some qualifications that are
made in relation to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. For example, the New Zealand
stockmarket may not be uniformly efficient because institutional investors are the most
prominent owners of New Zealand listed equities. Private ownership was approximately
19% as at 31 March 1998, compared with a figure of 40% as of 31 March 1991.119
Institutional investors do improve efficiency in the Efficient Market Hypothesis sense by
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reason of their information acquisition activities,120 However, institutional investment in
New Zealand is uneven. Institutional investors tend to be concentrated in the share
registers of larger companies and are less interested in small companies.121 This may
result in an efficient market in the largest companies but an inefficient market in smaller
companies.
Another reason why the New Zealand sharemarket may not be uniformly efficient
is because the shares of larger corporations are more actively traded than the shares of
smaller corporations and are consequently more informationally efficient.122 Under the
Efficient Market Hypothesis it is expected that the shares which are the most
informationally efficient are those that are the most actively traded because it is in the
course of share trading that shares prices reflect new information.123 Accordingly, under
the Efficient Market Hypothesis the shares prices of the largest companies listed on the
New Zealand Stock Exchange are more informationally efficient than the share prices of
smaller companies. Evidence of this proposition is evident from the fact that the three
companies with the highest trading volume on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, are
three of the largest companies in New Zealand.124
A further qualification to the supposition that the New Zealand stockmarket tends
to be semi-strong efficient is that there is ample evidence of stockmarket
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inconsistencies which are incompatible with the Efficient Market Hypothesis.125 This
means that in some situations the market mis-prices shares.126
Specific Manifestations of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
The development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is best illustrated by a
number of specific contemporary manifestations, including in the enactment of law and
judicial comment about it.
The Enactment of Law
In the United States today, it is commonly accepted that the efficient market
hypothesis constitutes the theoretical underpinning for the federal securities laws’
disclosure policy.127 The Securities and Exchange Commission requires full disclosure
of information about publicly traded companies by way of its regulations.128 Much of the
information released will not be read by those investors who purchase stocks in a
particular company, particularly because a great deal of the information released is
extremely technical and requires professional assistance to grasp its meaning.129
However, at least some investors or their agents will read the information and it will be
processed and incorporated into the price.130
The Securities and Exchange Commission has assimilated the theory into
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations in order to reduce unnecessary
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disclosure expenses for those companies where the stockmarket has already
assimilated all relevant information into the price of the shares.131 Since a typical
investor is unlikely to read all the information in a detailed prospectus and probably not
to understand the complex information if read.132
The United States Securities Commission removed the requirements for such
prospectuses and put into place a new requirement for periodic disclosure documents
known as “short forms”.133 The United States Securities Commission opined as follows:
“Forms S-3 and F-3 recognise the applicability of the efficient market theory to
those companies which provide a steady stream of high quality corporate
information to the marketplace and whose corporate information is broadly
disseminated. Information about these companies is constantly digested and
synthesized by financial analysts, who act as essential conduits in the continuous
flow of information to investors, and is broadly disseminated on a timely basis to
the financial press and other participants in the marketplace. Accordingly, at the
time S-3 and F-3 registrants determine to make an offering of securities, a large
number of information already has been disseminated to and digested by the
marketplace.”134
In New Zealand there has been little overt recognition of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis. This part of the chapter examines a number of New Zealand disclosure
rules that appear to rely on assumptions that relate to informationally efficient markets,
although these assumptions are not specifically articulated.
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The first example of a disclosure law that seems to rely on principles supported
by the Efficient Market Hypothesis is in the Securities Markets Act 1988, which provides
that a public issuer is not required to disclose material which is generally available to the
market. Section 19F provides that:
“19F. What information is generally available to the market—
(1)

For the purposes of this Act, information is ``generally available to
the market'' if—
(a)

it is information that—
(i)

has been made known in a manner that would, or
would be likely to, bring it to the attention of persons
who commonly invest in relevant securities; and

(ii)

since it was made known, a reasonable period for it to
be disseminated among those persons has expired;
or

(b)

it is likely that persons who commonly invest in relevant
securities can readily obtain the information (whether by
observation, use of expertise, purchase from other persons,
or any other means); or

(c)

it is information that consists of deductions, conclusions, or
inferences made or drawn from either or both of the kinds of
information referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).

134

Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,479 (Nov 17, 1983)

30
(2)

In this section, ``relevant securities'' means securities of a kind the
price or value of which might reasonably be expected to be affected
by the information.”

Security 19F(1)(a) and (b) are the market efficiency elements of the test. A
public issuer may not need to disclose information to the market because it is “generally
available to the market”. However, an analyst who obtains this information is unable to
advise any person about it because it would probably trigger the current “not publicly
available” test in the insider trading laws.135
Inherent in this clause is the notion that even if an individual investor does not
have knowledge of a particular piece of information, this is not a breach of the Act so
long as investors in general, or their advisers, are aware of the information.136 To the
extent that information is already in the public domain and is incorporated into the share
prices then it would be redundant to require the mandatory disclosure system to cover
the same ground.137 This recognises that in an efficient market, information is rapidly
reflected in share prices and that share prices generally reflect all publicly available
information.138 This recognition is founded on principles of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis in that the disclosure regime acknowledges that information is quickly
impounded into share prices in efficient markets and that this is highly desirable.139
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It does not matter if the knowledge or ability of an individual investor is
inadequate because investors are “protected” by the price set up by the market.140
Where the material has been made public so it is reasonably to rely on the market to
price the shares based on the information made available to it.141 This reliance is
justified because material which has already been released by means other than the
prospectus and is widely disseminated, available for free or at nominal cost, and closely
studied by financial analysts and other sophisticated market participants.142 Therefore,
this public information should be reflected in the price of the corporation’s shares.
There is no basis for repeating the information in a prospectus distributed to prospective
shareholders for the sale of new securities because the only information which has not
been incorporated into the share price are the details of the new issue.143

Implicit in

these provisions is the concept that even if an individual investor is not aware of a
particular piece of information that is not critical so long as investors in general, or their
advisers, have knowledge of the information.144
This disclosure regime closely follows the Australian version, and that is as a
result of the new law described to be bringing the New Zealand market in line with best
international practice. It is a struggle between “the market fairness” element (the

140

Scott, Kenneth E., Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy in
Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, Richard A. Poser and Kenneth E.
Scott (eds), (1980), at p123
141
Blair, Mark, & Ramsay, Ian M., Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules and Securities
Regulation in Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, Walker, G. & Fisse, B.
(eds), at Securities Regulation, at p 278
142
Id. at p 278
143
Id. at p 279
144
Id. at p 277

32
equally informed market) and the “market efficiency” element (the “generally available”
test), which may not be reconcilable as they are two different policy goals.145
Another reflection of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in New Zealand is through
self-regulation of the market. Self-regulation is as an expression of the free market
forces which underpin the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Securities Markets Act
1988 which provides for some self-regulation by the securities industry. The Act
includes responsibilities and obligations for the New Zealand Stock Exchange, the
leading stock exchange which is the New Zealand equivalent to the New York Stock
Exchange. The New Zealand Stock Exchange is the only registered stock exchange in
New Zealand. The New Zealand Stock Exchange also has its own conduct rules which
it uses as a matter of contract to regulate between the New Zealand Stock Exchange
and market participants. The Act puts specific obligations on the New Zealand Stock
Exchange, including obligations to:
•

refer specific matters to the New Zealand Securities Commission;

•

provide assistance to the New Zealand Securities Commission when requested;

•

submit its rules of conduct, and changes to those rules, to the Minister; and

•

consult with the New Zealand Securities Commission about determinations
concerning the continuous disclosure rules of the New Zealand Stock Exchange.146
The New Zealand Securities Commission and the New Zealand Stock Exchange

both have important roles to play in the securities market. In essence, the New Zealand
Securities Commission is the statutory regulator and is charged with many

145

Franks, Stephen, Securities Markets Act: the Russian model, Company and Securities Law
Bulletin, Issue 12 December 2002 at p 121
146
Section 36, Securities Markets Act 1988

33
responsibilities under the law. However, it does not have the ability to prosecute for
criminal breaches of the law; that is the domain of the Registrar of Companies. The
New Zealand Stock Exchange can be considered as the frontline regulator, which
monitors trading activity and is concerned with breaches of its rules.
Referrals
The New Zealand Stock Exchange must refer specific matters to the New
Zealand Securities Commission. This arises where:
•

the New Zealand Stock Exchange takes any disciplinary action against a person;

•

the New Zealand Stock Exchange know or suspects that a person has
committed, is committing, or is likely to commit a “significant” contravention of:
o the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s rules of conduct;
o the Securities Act 1978, the Securities Markets Act 1988, or the
Takeovers Act 1993.147
Under the Securities Markets Act these are compulsory referrals which do not

allow much flexibility for self-regulation. There is a further type of referral which is
known as a discretionary referral. This allows the New Zealand Stock Exchange to
draw the attention of the New Zealand Securities Commission to any other information
that the New Zealand Securities Commission considers may assist the New Zealand
Securities Commission in carrying out of its functions.
The New Zealand Securities Commission also has the ability to refer matters to
the New Zealand Stock Exchange, and in particular matters relating to the New Zealand
Stock Exchange’s rules of conduct or the application of those rules.
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Referrals by both the New Zealand Stock Exchange and the New Zealand
Securities Commission are subject to procedures for provision of information,
assessment and reporting.
A further aspect of self-regulation is that the New Zealand Stock Exchange is
empowered to administer the continuous disclosure rules to ensure listed companies
make disclosures on a regular basis. However, if the New Zealand Stock Exchange
proposes to make a “determination” relating to its continuous disclosure rules then the
Securities Markets Act requires the New Zealand Stock Exchange to notify the New
Zealand Securities Commission. A “determination” is a ruling on, or a waiver from, any
of the “continuous disclosure provisions” of the listing rules of the New Zealand Stock
Exchange. “Continuous disclosure provisions” mean any provisions that require a
public issuer to notify information about matters or events as they arise for the purpose
of that information being made available to market participants.
The government perceives the legislation as enabling the two organisations, the
New Zealand Stock Exchange and the New Zealand Securities Commission, working
together for regulation of the New Zealand securities market.148 The role of the New
Zealand Stock Exchange is as a front-line regulator, which has the ability to sanction
market participants when necessary. Where appropriate and possible the New Zealand
Securities Commission will notify the New Zealand Stock Exchange of any information
which relates to trading, regulation or market conduct that may lead the New Zealand
Securities Commission to given notice of an intention to make a direction.149 If the New
Zealand Securities Commission does raise any such matter, the New Zealand Stock
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Exchange will consider the issue as soon as practicable, and inform the New Zealand
Securities Commission.150 Representatives of each organisation will meet, where
practicable, to review the matters. The purpose is for the New Zealand Stock Exchange
and the New Zealand Securities Commission to know and understand each other’s
perspectives, and, if possible, to preclude disruption to the market.151 It appears that
leaving the New Zealand Stock Exchange with the responsibility of self-regulation is a
reflection of the free market policies underpinning the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The
benefits of self-regulation are a reduction in costs due to the increased flexibility than is
possible under rigid statutory rulings.
This part of the chapter examines a number of existing disclosure rules which
appear to rely on assumptions which concern informationally efficient markets.
The same justification used for section 19F of the Securities Act 1978 underlies a
New Zealand corporation’s ability to issue a short-form prospectus under the Act. The
requirement to issue a short-form prospectus can be substituted for the assurance of a
full prospectus and contains only transaction specific information rather than the
comprehensive details normally required in a prospectus. The justification for this
reduction in disclosure is that the short-form prospectus is sufficient to advise the
investor of the risks because all information has already been incorporated into the
share price.152
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There are three other justifications for reducing the disclosure contained in a
prospectus:
•

Short-form prospectuses are more cost-effective;153

•

Verification of disclosure;154

•

Confidence that the investor may find little value in a prospectus.155

Disclosure by way of a detailed prospectus can be seen as an inefficient (if not
irrelevant) means of information disclosure.156 It is argued that investors make no real
use of prospectuses and therefore there is no rational expectation that investors will
read the complex and detailed information provided to them by means of a
prospectus.157
Comparison
It is widely accepted today that the New York Stock Exchange represents an
efficient market. However, current literature identifies a number of anomalies to the
efficient market hypothesis. Particularly relevant to a comparison between the United
States and New Zealand is the “small firm effect”. The concept of the small firm effect is
that the prices of securities issued by larger companies react more quickly and
predictably to the distribution of information than the prices of securities issued by
smaller companies.158 Research into smaller firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and other firms of a comparable size have revealed a small firm effect
because commonly, investors are less interested in smaller corporations and thus
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market information is not processed efficiently.159 This is relevant to the comparison of
the effect of the efficient market hypothesis on the New Zealand and United States
markets because New Zealand firms tend to be on a far smaller scale than in the United
States.
A related anomaly is comparisons of the New York Stock Exchange with smaller
stock markets show that smaller firms which do not trade on the New York Stock
Exchange are not as efficient as those that do. This suggests that smaller stocks have
a market which is not as efficient as the New York Stock Exchange securities.160

One

study that compared market efficiency between stock exchanges, demonstrated that
after an earnings announcement the New York Stock Exchange displayed certain
responses four to five weeks before the American Stock Exchange and the over-thecounter markets.161
Judicial Comment
In the United States the Efficient Market Hypothesis is a powerful force in
contemporary securities regulation.162 From its origins as an economic theory
developed by a variety of American scholars of economics, it has evolved into a working
tool for legal academics,163 and both the courts and the United States Securities
Commission quote it as authority for an array of ideas and schemes.164
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In the United States the courts have referred directly to the Efficient Market
Hypothesis as an authority for their decisions, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.165
For example, in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., Judge Easterbrook espoused
that “[t]he United States Securities Commission believes that the markets correctly
value the securities of well-followed firms, so that new sales may rely on information
that has been digested and expressed in the securities price.” 166
The United States Supreme Court was strongly influenced by the Efficient Market
Hypothesis in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.167 In that case the Supreme Court accepted the
Efficient Market Hypothesis in relation to the fraud on the market doctrine. The Court
determined that the key principle underlying the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis was “that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets
reflects all publicly available information”.168 This principle functioned as the basis for
presuming that investors trading in a particular security could satisfy the reliance
requirement in a fraud action in relation to that security.169
Conversely, there has been very little litigation arising out of the Securities Act in
New Zealand, particularly compared to commercial or company law.170 In particular,
there has been no reference in the Efficient Market Hypothesis by any of the courts in
New Zealand.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The Relationship between the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Mandatory
Disclosure
Academic theorists have asserted that the Efficient Market Hypothesis is “the
context in which serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place”.171
The extent of mandatory disclosure required under the regulatory system has
been debated since the system was first passed in the United States in 1934 and New
Zealand in 1978.172 The express purpose of the 1934 Act and the New Zealand 1978
Act is to prevent fraud against investors by enforcing truth in securities. However,
because the Efficient Market Hypothesis is purported to provide the protection investors
need, the investor protection purpose has been subject to substantial criticism from
supporters of Efficient Market Hypothesis.173 Economists use a reasonably
straightforward linear theory under the Efficient Market Hypothesis to show why public
capital markets are efficient, and can establish that information is rapidly and precisely
absorbed into share prices.174 Proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis then
argued that if the public capital markets are efficient in the strong or semi-strong form
then mandatory disclosure is superfluous, and private incentives would be sufficient to
encourage public issuers to produce and distribute information or other parties to
171
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discover information to provide to investors.175 Given the private incentives, the
necessity of a securities regulatory system is negated because the progression of
information production and distribution, and consequent incorporation into the price
would afford sufficient investor protection.176
Conversely, there is an opposing viewpoint for disclosure rules in relation to the
Efficient Market Hypothesis.177 Firstly, even if a stockmarket is informationally efficient
mandatory disclosure rules may still be vital.178 Even though all publicly available
information is reflected in the share price, these prices may not reflect private
information, therefore compulsory disclosure is a reliable method of putting private
information in the public domain.179 In contrast, it is possible that mandatory disclosure
rules may not add any value to the disclosure process because private information is
incorporated into the price of shares in a number of ways, and particularly by way of
investment research by analysts and other activities by the private sector information
system.180 Therefore the price of shares will naturally incorporate a considerable
amount of information made otherwise than through the compulsory disclosure
system.181
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Conclusion
Securities are not tangible products but are an intangible interest in a corporation
which can be issued in unlimited amounts.182 Therefore securities regulation is directed
to the information behind the securities and this information is required to be accessible
to the market on the basis that this information may not otherwise be accessible.183
Securities regulators in both New Zealand and the United States attempt to correct any
market failure in the provision of information by compelling information to be made
available.184 The information intended to be disclosed in a prospectus is the information
which investors and their professional advisers may require in order to make an
informed evaluation of the corporation’s financial position, assets and liabilities, profits
and losses and prospects for the future.185
The structure and regulation of New Zealand’s securities markets are currently
undergoing profound changes. These changes are intended to bring about a
convergence of New Zealand’s securities regulatory practice with international
regulatory practice.186
New Zealand has always looked to overseas regulatory models for the detailed
design of its commercial laws.187 Usually, New Zealand tends to look to Australia,
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which is a country in the same region and with many similarities and economic links.188
The New Zealand government currently operates from a presumption that commercial
laws will be based on an Australian model rather than a model from any other country.
Nevertheless, both the Companies Act 1993 and the Personal Property Securities Act
1999 were based on the Canadian models.189 Whichever model is used the
government intends to make changes to fit with New Zealand conditions and institutions
and the benefits that can be realised in a smaller country need to be evaluated in light of
the fixed costs of certain types of regulations.190 New Zealand is also attempting to
create a consistency with international regulatory norms by adopting regulatory
standards that comply with international requirements.191
Surprisingly, the legal and regulatory systems in the United States and New
Zealand have many similarities. Both require the production of a prospectus on the
issue of securities to the public, both compel periodic reporting for its largest companies
and both empower the Securities Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission to act with broad authority over all aspects of the securities markets.
Even with such broad diversity in the financial environments of New Zealand and
the United States, aspects of the Efficient Market Hypothesis can be identified in both
countries. Although the New Zealand markets are much smaller, the Efficient Market
Hypothesis is a useful tool for considering the relationship between efficient markets
and mandatory disclosure.
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